Religion has always been a useful political tool. Unlike ordinary political slogans, faith speaks to people’s deepest convictions. It gives leaders something that political manifestos rarely can: moral authority. History is full of examples. Kings in medieval Europe claimed they ruled by divine right. Across the Muslim world, rulers often sought religious endorsement to strengthen their legitimacy. Politics gains power when it borrows the language of faith.
Pakistan is no exception. In fact, it may be one of the clearest examples of this pattern. Almost every major political leader has, at one point or another, wrapped political objectives in religious symbolism. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto introduced religious measures during a period of political unrest. Nawaz Sharif sought greater authority through the language of Shariah. Imran Khan frequently invoked the idea of Riyasat-e-Madina.
Yet no contemporary politician illustrates the relationship between religion and politics more clearly than Maulana Fazlur Rehman.
For nearly half a century, the Maulana has remained a significant figure in Pakistani politics. Governments have changed, military rulers have come and gone, but he has managed to remain relevant. Despite rarely commanding overwhelming electoral strength, he has often exercised influence far beyond the number of seats his party holds.
Few politicians have mastered political survival quite like him.
He has worked with governments he once criticised and criticised governments he once worked with. There is nothing unusual about political compromise. Politics is, after all, the art of negotiation. What makes the Maulana’s case interesting is that he speaks not merely as a politician but also as a religious leader. This dual role raises questions that go beyond ordinary politics.
Even more striking is the contrast between the Maulana’s commitment to democracy and the internal structure of his own party. For decades, he has been one of Pakistan’s most vocal advocates of constitutional rule, parliamentary supremacy and representative government. Yet the JUI-F has remained under his leadership for almost half a century. This raises a legitimate question. If democracy is the best principle for governing a country of 240 million people, should it not also be robust enough to function within a political party?
The clearest example came during the controversy over madrassa registration. Maulana Fazlur Rehman made the passage of the Madrassa Registration Bill one of the conditions for JUI-F’s support for the 26th Constitutional Amendment. He argued that seminaries should remain independent and resisted arrangements which, in his view, would place them under excessive government control.
There is nothing illegitimate about political bargaining. Every politician negotiates. The question is why madrassas repeatedly appear at the centre of those negotiations. If the objective is educational reform, then debates should revolve around curriculum, standards, transparency and opportunities for students. Instead, madrassas often emerge as political leverage in larger power struggles. That is where an educational issue begins to resemble a political instrument.
One question is worth considering here: when a religious leader enters politics, who holds him accountable?
For decades, the Maulana has criticised corruption, elite privilege and failures of governance. Yet after nearly half a century in politics, the public is entitled to ask what tangible improvements his influence has produced for the causes he claims to champion. Religious seminaries remain underfunded, graduates continue to face limited opportunities and many of the social problems that religious parties have long promised to address remain unresolved.
Pakistan has wrestled with that question for decades. The career of Maulana Fazlur Rehman offers a useful lens through which to examine it. His political journey reminds us that faith can be a source of moral guidance, but it can also become a source of political leverage. The challenge for any society is ensuring that the first does not become subordinate to the second.
